EVELINE FETERIS / HARM KLOOSTERHUIS / H. JOSÉ PLUG / CAREL SMITH
In legal argumentation, dissensus is the point of departure, consensus the endpoint. However, the relationship between dissensus and consensus in argumentation is more complex than it looks at first sight. First, a fruitful debate presupposes not only a difference of opinion, but also commonalities of meaning and corresponding rationality criteria, that is, consensus or common ground. Second, legal argumentation does not always result in consensus. It also explicates and refines differences of opinion about the means of proof, methods of interpretation, or the values that should prevail. It follows that in legal discourse, dissensus and consensus are not only opposites, but also interconnected in a complex way.
Legal Argumentation: Reasoned Dissensus and Common Ground includes contributions from law, argumentation theory, logic and philosophical perspectives, discussing the intriguing interconnection between dissensus and consensus in legal argumentation. The insights may be of interest not only to experts in Legal Methodology, Argumentation Theory and Legal Evidence, but to judges, lawyers and law students as well.
